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of the PDA. With support from business 
groups and the Reagan administration, 
petitioners claimed that the PDA requires 
pregnant workers to be treated the same as, 
but not better than, workers with other 
disabilities. Based on the legislative history 
behind the enactment of the PDA, the 
Court agreed with the court of appeals' 
conclusion that its purpose is to provide 
"a floor beneath which pregnancy disabil-
ity benefits may not drop-not a ceiling 
above which they may not rise." Guerra, 
758 F.2d at 396. The 1978 amendment was 
passed specifically to overturn a 1976 Su-
preme Court decision in General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 ( 1976) which 
had held that discrimination on the basis 
of pregnancy was not sex discrimination 
under Title VII. The Court further expli-
cated that Congress intended the Act "to 
provide relief for working women and 
to end discrimination against pregnant 
workers," and that had Congress intended 
to prohibit preferential treatment, it could 
have expressly done so within the PDA 
itself. In support of this latter conclusion, 
the Court noted similar state statutes in 
force at the time the PDA was enacted, and 
the House and Senate reports which sug-
gested that these laws would continue in 
effect under the Act. Finally, the Court 
found that§ 12945(b)(2) of the California 
statute is not inconsistent with the PDA 
because both "achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities and remove barriers 
that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group ... of employees over 
other employees." 474 U.S. __ (1986), 
citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
u.s. 424, 429-430 (1971). 
The last part of petitioners' claim stated 
that § 12945(b)(2) requires employers to 
violate Title VII because they cannot com-
ply with both the federal and state law. The 
Court was quick to invalidate this argu-
ment, stating that the California statute 
merely establishes benefits that employers 
must provide to pregnant workers, and 
that it does not prevent employers from 
giving comparable benefits to other dis-
abled employees. In sum, the Court de-
nied petitioners' facial challenge to§ 12945 
(b)(2), ruling that the special benefits pro-
vided by the statute as construed by the 
Fair Employment and Housing Commis-
sion do not violate federal civil rights laws. 
"By taking pregnancy into account," Jus-
tice Marshall said, "California's pregnancy 
disability leave statute allows women, as 
well as men, to have families without los-
ing their jobs." 474 U.S. __ (1986). 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White 
felt that the California statute was "in 
square conflict" with the federal law be-
cause it requires "every employer to have a 
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disability leave policy for pregnancy even 
if it has none for any other disability." 
Therefore, the state statute is pre-empted 
by the federal law. In pointing to the plain 
language of the PDA, Justice White wrote 
that it clearly mandates equal treatment 
for employees, including pregnant workers, 
and that it does not intend pregnancy to be 
in a class by itself within Title VII. Fur-
ther, the minority felt that the Court's in-
terpretation of the PDA with respect to the 
state statute places an unfair burden on Cal-
ifornia employers by requiring them to im-
plement new minimum disability leave 
programs to satisfy both the state and fed-
eral laws. 
The effect of this decision on other state 
statutes is clear. While not mandating the 
type of preferential treatment afforded in 
California, the holding in Guerra evidences 
the Court's willingness to uphold similar 
statutes in the future as non-violative of 
discrimination laws. Those states which 
decide to enact preferential treatment 
statutes may find that they discourage em-
ployers from hiring women. 
Maryland has included pregnancy in its 
fair employment practices laws, but not to 
the same extent as California. Article 49B, 
§ 17 of the Annotated Code of Maryland 
could not be construed as requiring the 
"special treatment" involved in Guerra. 
The statut~ merely calls for equal treat-
ment with respect to pregnancy, stating 
that any insurance or sick leave plan "shall 
be applied to disability due to pregnancy 
or childbirth on the same terms and condi-
tions as they are applied to other tempo-
rary disabilities subject to the provisions 
of this section." (Emphasis added). 
-Barbara E. Wixon 
Chase v. State: LEON"GOOD 
FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
EXTENDED TO PROBATION 
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS. 
In a case of first impression, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland in Chase v. 
State, 68 Md. App. 413, 511 A.2d 1128 
(1986) ruled that generally, the exclusionary 
rule may not be applied to probation revo-
cation proceedings. In so holding, the 
court of special appeals has followed the 
trend of a majority of other jurisdictions. 
Appellant Jerome Edwin Chase was 
convicted of robbery by the Circuit Court 
for Prince George's County. His sentence 
was suspended in favor of five years pro-
bation. Two years later, after he had al-
ready been cited and resentenced for pro-
bation violations, Chase was arrested and 
charged with intent to distribute mari-
juana and simple possession. While the 
criminal case was pending, the State filed a 
petition to revoke Chase's probation; alleg-
ing a failure to "obey all laws." At the trial 
for the criminal charges, the trial court 
found the Appellant's arrest to be without 
probable cause and suppressed the evidence 
recovered from him at the arrest. Two 
months later, the State dismissed the crim-
inal charges. However, the petition to re-
voke Chase's probation was not dismissed. 
At his probation revocation hearing, Ap-
pellant moved {based on the exclusionary 
rule) to have the evidence seized at the 
time of his arrest suppressed, or have the 
proceeding dismissed. The court, in deny-
ing Chase's motion applied a balancing 
test and determined that "the probation 
process and community safety interests far 
outweigh any deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule." In light of their finding, the 
lower court therein ruled that the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply to probation re-
vocation proceedings. 
In dealing with this case of first impres-
sion, the court of special appeals traced the 
chronological history of the exclusionary 
rule at the Supreme Court level from Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) to the 
present. Judge Wilner, writing for the ma-
jority, noted that even before Mapp v. 
Ohio, 364 U.S. 643 (1961), [which over-
turned Wolf v. Colorado, when it held that 
"all evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, 
by that same authority, inadmissible in a 
state court;" Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643], "the 
[Supreme] Court has viewed the exclu-
sionary rule as a deterrent rather than a 
redressive measure", Chase, 68 Md. App. 
at 419, 511 A.2d 1128. Atthe end of their 
historical analysis, the court herein recog-
nized the fact that the balancing test [ es-
tablished in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 894 
( 1984)] "remains an integral part of the 
decisional law in this area." Chase at 420, 
511 A.2d 1128. In Leon, the Supreme Court 
actually retracted the exclusionary rule by 
withdrawing its application to evidence 
obtained in reasonable reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate 
which was later found to be unsupported 
by probable cause. The deterrent effect of 
the exclusionary rule on the police would 
be insignificant and is greatly outweighed 
by its detrimental effect on criminal prose-
cutions. 
In their analysis of Maryland case law on 
the application of the exclusionary rule, 
the court of special appeals looked to 
Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 
632 (1981), where the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland adopted the ruling of U.S. v. 
Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.) cere. denied 
429 U.S. 894 (1976) and declined to ex-
tend the exclusionary rule to sentencing 
proceedings. The court of appeals' ra-
tionale was that the exclusionary rule's ad-
ditional deterrent effect would be in-
significant or is greatly outweighed by its 
detrimental effect. However, the court 
therein concluded that if it can be shown 
that the illegally obtained evidence pro-
vided an incentive for the illegal seizure, 
the exclusionary rule would then apply. 
Such incentive would be evidenced by proof 
that seizure of the evidence was motivated 
by the possibility of enhancing the ac-
cused's sentence. See Logan, 289 Md. at 
486 and Lee, 540 F.2d at 1212. 
The court in Chase also analyzed how 
evidence falling under this category is han-
dled in probation revocation proceedings 
nationwide. Although the court noted 
semantical differences in the various ap-
proaches, it found that the prevailing ap-
proach applied is the "cost/benefit analy-
sis". "A probation revocation proceeding 
is not a criminal prosecution but is more in 
the nature of an administrative hearing in-
timately concerned with the probationer's 
rehabilitation. Thus, the court must bal-
ance the competing interests of the com-
munity with the rehabilitative goal of pro-
bation." Chase, 68 Md. App. at 422, 511 
A.2d 1128. In light of this standard, the 
court concluded that the exclusionary rule 
generally did not apply to probation revo-
cation proceedings. Combining Maryland 
case law with the semantical variations 
that exist nationwide, the court then in-
corporated a good faith exception into 
their newly adopted rule. In discussing 
their standard, Judge Wilner wrote: 
We agree, as a general proposition, that 
the deterrent effect of such an applica-
tion [of the exclusionary rule] will be 
minimal and that whatever marginal 
deterrent benefit might accrue would 
be far outweighed by the harmful ef-
fect of denying access to relevant in-
formation concerning a probationer's 
behavior .... [Nevertheless], [w]e can-
not permit the police to use this as an 
incentive to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment .... [W]e think the best way to 
deter individual violations is simply to 
apply the exclusionary rule upon a 
showing that the police did not act in 
good faith in effecting the search and 
seizure. The "good faith" standard ... 
encompasses all aspects of the officer's 
actions- how egregious the violation 
was, whether the officer knew the per-
son was on probation ... , what the cir-
cumstances were that led to the seizure. 
Chase, 68 Md. App. at 425, 426, 511 A.2d 
1128. 
In concluding their discussion of the "good 
faith" exception, the court held that the 
burden is on the defendant initially to pro-
duce lack of good faith. Upon this produc-
tion, the burden then shifts to the State to 
prove otherwise. 
At the time of publication this case was 
set for argument before the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland. Although the court of 
appeals granted certiorari, it is doubtful 
that the case will be reversed because the 
court of special appeals' reasoning follows 
the national trend. Chase should help in 
lessening the frustration the law enforce-
ment community feels in their pursuit of 
justice and community protection. It re-
mains to be seen whether their pursuit will 
become a reality. 
-Christopher Hale 
jersey Shore State Bank v. United 
States: IRS NOT REQUIRED TO 
PROVIDE NOTICE AND A 
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT TO 
A THIRD-PARTY LENDER PRIOR 
TO INITIATING A CIVIL SUIT TO 
COLLECT EMPLOYMENT TAXES 
In Jersey Shore State Bank v. United 
States, 479 U.S. __ , 87-1 U.S.T.C. 
para. 9131 (1987}, the Supreme Court in a 
unanimous decision held that the IRS was 
not required to provide notice and a de-
mand for payment to a third-party lender 
who is liable under I.R.C. § 3505 prior to 
initiating a civil suit to collect employment 
taxes. This decision resolved a conflict be-
tween the circuits and is consistent with 
the interpretation of the Third and Ninth 
circuits. 
The Supreme Court in Jersey Shore State 
Bank considered the relationship between 
I.R.C. § 3505 (which provides for personal 
liability on the part of third parties paying 
or providing funds for wages) and I.R.C. 
§ 6303(a) (which requires that notice of an 
assessment be provided to persons liable 
for unpaid taxes before an assignment can 
be imposed}. In rejecting the bank's claim 
that the government was required under 
I.R.C. § 6303(a) to provide notice and de-
mand for payment to a lender bank that is 
liable under I.R.C. § 3505, the Court 
determined that a third-party lender is not 
the "person" intended to be protected un-
der I.R.C. § 6303(a). 
I.R.C. § 3505 applies to a third-party 
lender, surety or other person who is not 
an employer, but who pays wages either 
directly to that employee or group of em-
ployees, or supplies the funds to pay those 
employees. I.R.C. § 3505(a) imposes lia-
bility on those lenders, sureties or persons 
for a sum equal to any unpaid withholding 
taxes and interest if the wages were paid 
directly to the employee. However, under 
I.R.C. § 3505(b), if they did not pay the 
employees directly, but provided the funds 
to the employer, their liability would be 
limited to 25% of the amount of the loan. 
Prior to this section's enactment in 1966, 
the employers were the only individuals 
subject to liability. 
I.R.C. § 3505 was enacted in order to 
correct problems which occurred when 
employers obtained net payroll financing. 
United States v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 
781 F.2d 974, 976 (3d Cir. 1986). Net pay-
roll financing, used frequently in the con-
struction industry, is a practice whereby 
the lender provides funds for payment of 
employees' net wages, but not for payment 
of withholding taxes. This type of financ-
ing usually results when a financially 
strapped sub-contractor cannot meet its 
payroll obligations. The general contrac-
tor will then pay the sub-contractor's em-
ployees' net wages. Problems arise when 
the sub-contractor is unable to pay with-
holding taxes to the government while the 
government is required to credit the em-
ployees account. In such cases "[ r ]ecourse 
against the employer [is] often fruitless, 
because it [is] frequently without any fi-
nancial resources. And the government 
could not proceed against third parties 
who paid the net wages because they were 
not 'employers' under the code, and there-
fore not liable for the taxes." United States 
v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 781 F.2d 974, 
976 (3d Cir. 1986). 
In the current case, Jersey Shore State 
Bank provided net payroll financing to 
Pennmount Industries, Inc., from the 
fourth quarter of 1977 through the first 
quarter of 1980. The government in its 
complaint alleged that Jersey Shore paid 
wages directly to Pennmount employees 
and supplied funds for the purpose of pay-
ing wages, with the knowledge that Penn-
mount did not intend to or would not be 
able to make timely payments or deposits 
of the federal taxes required to be deducted 
and withheld. The complaint also alleges 
that the Bank's liability is $76,547.57 
plus interest under I.R.C. § 3505(a}, and 
$72,069.00 plus interest under I.R.C. 
§ 3505(b). The district court granted the 
bank's motion for summary judgment be-
cause of the government's failure to pro-
vide timely notice as required by I.R.C. 
§ 6303(a). The United States appealed and 
the third circuit reversed. In examining 
the legislative history of the statute, the 
third circuit concluded that 6303(a) did 
not apply to collection actions under 3505 
because 6303(a) was intended to protect 
taxpayers from harsh administrative col-
lection procedures. The court noted, how-
ever, that under I.R.C. § 3505, the third-
party lender was not in danger of having 
any of its property seized or attached to 
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